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A Distributed Sequential Algorithm for
Collaborative Intrusion Detection Networks
Quanyan Zhu, Carol J. Fung, Raouf Boutaba and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract—Collaborative intrusion detection networks are often
used to gain better detection accuracy and cost efficiency as
compared to a single host-based intrusion detection system (IDS).
Through cooperation, it is possible for a local IDS to detect new
attacks that may be known to other experienced acquaintances.
In this paper, we present a sequential hypothesis testing method
for feedback aggregation for each individual IDS in the net-
work. Our simulation results corroborate our theoretical results
and demonstrate the properties of cost efficiency and accuracy
compared to other heuristic methods. The analytical result on
the lower-bound of the average number of acquaintances for
consultation is essential for the design and configuration of IDSs
in a collaborative environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
As computer systems become increasingly complex, the
accompanied potential threats also grow to be more sophis-
ticated. Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and
identifying attempted unauthorized system access or manip-
ulation. It is one of the most important tools for a network
administrator to detect security breaches along with firewalls.
An IDS can be categorized as either host-based or network-
based. A host-based IDS (HIDS) is intended primarily to
monitor a host, which can be a server, workstation, or any
networked device, whereas a network-based IDS (NIDS) is
used to protect a group of computer hosts by capturing and
analyzing network packets. Even though these two types of
IDSs are commonly employed in an enterprise network, they
do not adequately leverage the possible information exchange
between IDSs. The exchange of alert data or decisions be-
tween administrative domains can effectively supplement the
knowledge gained by a single local IDS. In a collaborative
environment, an IDS can learn the global state of network
attack patterns from its peers. By augmenting the information
gathered from across the network, an IDS can have a more
precise picture of an attacker’s behavior and hence increase
its accuracy and efficiency of detection.
Collaborative intrusion detection networks (CIDNs) have
distinct features from some other types of social networks such
as P2P network and E-commerce network, where the collab-
oration is one-time or short-term pattern. The collaboration in
IDN is usually long-term based. Unlike other social networks,
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communication in CIDNs is often of “low-cost”, which leads
to the possibility of using test messages (a communication
overhead generated on purpose to test the reliability of the
collaborators).
Based on the aforementioned properties, we design a CIDN
which utilizes test messages to learn the reliability of others
and consultation requests to seek diagnosis from collaborators.
The architecture design is shown in Figure 1, where NIDSs
and HIDSs are connected into a collaboration network. Each
IDS maintains a list of acquaintances (collaborators) and test
messages are sent to acquaintances periodically to update its
belief on peer reliability. When an IDS receives intrusion
alerts and lacks confidence to determine the nature of the
alerted source, alert messages are sent to its acquaintances
for evaluation. An acquaintance IDS analyzes the received
intrusion information and replies with a feedback of posi-
tive/negative diagnosis. The ambivalent IDS collects feedback
from its acquaintances and decides whether an alarm should
be raised or not to the administrator. If an alarm is raised, the
suspicious intrusion flow will be suspended and the system
administrator investigates the intrusion immediately.
In this paper, we design an efficient distributed sequential
algorithm for IDSs to make decision based on the feedback
from its collaborators. We investigate four possible outcomes
of a decision: false positive (FP), false negative (FN), true
positive (TP), and true negative (TN). Each outcome is asso-
ciated with a cost. Our proposed sequential hypothesis testing
based feedback aggregation provides improved cost efficiency
as compared to other heuristic methods, such as the simple
average model [1] and the weighted average model [2], [3]. In
addition, the algorithm reduces the communication overhead
as it aggregates feedback until a predefined FP and TP goal is
reached. Our analytical model effectively estimates the number
of acquaintances needed for an IDS to reach its predefined
intrusion detection goal. Such result is crucial to the design of
an IDS acquaintance list in CIDN.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we review some existing CIDNs in the literature
and IDS feedback aggregation techniques. The problem for-
mulation is in Section III, where we use hypothesis testing
to minimize the cost of decisions and sequential hypothesis
testing to form consultation termination policy for predefined
goals. In Section IV, we use a simulation approach to evaluate
the effectiveness of our aggregation system and validate the
analytical model. Section V concludes the paper and identifies
directions for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Many CIDNs were proposed in the literature, such as
Indra [4], DOMINO [5], and NetShield [6]. However, these
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works did not address the problem that the system might be
degraded by some compromised insiders who are dishonest or
malicious.
Simple majority voting [7] and trust management are com-
monly used to detect malicious insiders in CIDNs. Existing
trust management models for CIDN are either linear as in
[2], [8], or Bayesian model as in [3]. They are based on
heuristic where the feedback aggregation is either a simple
average [1] or a weighted average [3]. Moreover, no decision
cost is considered in these models. In this paper, we use a
sequential hypothesis testing model aiming at finding cost-
minimizing decisions based on collected feedback. Existing
work that applies hypothesis testing for intrusion detection
includes [9] and [10], where a central data fusion center is
used to aggregate results from distributed sensors in a local
area network. However, their methodologies are limited to the
context that all participants need to engage in every detection
case. While in our context, IDSs may not be involved in all
intrusions detection and the collected responses may be from
different groups of IDSs each time.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the feedback aggregation as
a sequential hypothesis testing problem. Consider a set of N
nodes, N , connected in a network, which can be represented
by a graph G = (N , E). The set E contains the undirected
links between nodes, indicating the acquaintances of IDSs in
the network.
Let Yi, i ∈ N , be a random variable denoting the decision
of IDS i observed by its peer IDSs on its acquaintance list
Ni. The random variable Yi takes values in Yi = [0, 1]. In the
intrusion detection setting, Yi = 0 says that IDS i decides that
there is no intrusion while Yi = 1 means that IDS i raises
an alarm of possible detection of intrusion. Each IDS makes
its decision based upon its own experience of the previous
attacks and its own sophistication of detection. We let pi as the
probability mass function defined on Yi such that pi(Yi = 0)
and pi(Yi = 1) denote the probability of no intrusion and the
probability of intrusion from i, respectively.
We let Yi := [Yj ]j∈Nj ∈ Yi :=
∏
j∈Ni
Yi be an
observation vector of an IDS i that contains the feedback
from its peers in the acquaintance list. Each IDS has two
hypotheses H0 and H1. H0 hypothesizes that no intrusion
is detected whereas H1 forwards a hypothesis that intrusion
is detected and alarm needs to be raised. Note that we
intentionally drop the superscript i because we assume that
each IDS attempts to make the same decision. Denote by
pii0, pi
i
1 the apriori probabilities on each hypothesis such that
pii0 = P[H0], pi
i
1 = P[H1] and pii0 + pii1 = 1, for all i ∈ N .
The conditional probability pi(Yi = yi|Hl), l = 1, 2 denotes
the probability of a complete feedback being yi ∈
∏
j∈Ni
Yj
given the hypothesis. Assuming peers make decisions inde-
pendently (this is reasonable if acquaintances are appropriately
selected), we can rewrite the conditional probability as
p
i(Yi = yi|Hl) =
∏
j∈Ni
pj(Yj = yj |Hl), i ∈ N , l = 0, 1. (1)
A hypothesis testing problem is one of finding a decision
function δi(Yi) : Yi → {0, 1} to partition the observation
space Yi into two disjoint sets Yi0 and Yi1, where Yi0 = {yi :
δi(yi) = 0}, and Yi1 = {yi : δi(yi) = 1}.
To find an optimal decision function according to some
criterion, we introduce the cost function Cill′ , l, l′ = 0, 1,
which represents IDS i’s cost of deciding that Hl is true when
Hl′ holds. More specifically, Ci01 is the cost associated with
a missed intrusion or attack and Ci10 refers to the cost of
false alarm, while Ci00, Ci11 are the incurred costs when the
decision meets the true situation. In several situations, it can
be shown that decision functions can be picked as function
of the likelihood ratio given by Li(yi) = p
i(yi|H1)
pi(yi|H0)
. (see [9],
[10])
A threshold Bayesian decision rule is expressed in terms of
the likelihood ratio and is given by
δiB(y
i) =
{
1 if Li(yi) ≥ τ i
0 if Li(yi) < τ i , (2)
where the threshold τ i is defined by
τ i =
(Ci10 − C
i
00)pi
i
0
(Ci01 − C
i
11)pi
i
1
. (3)
If the costs are symmetric and the two hypothesis are equal
likely, then the rule in (2) reduces to the maximum likelihood
(ML) decision rule
δiML(y) =
{
1 if pi(yi|H1) ≥ pi(yi|H0)
0 if pi(yi|H1) < pi(yi|H0)
, (4)
A. Sequential Hypothesis Testing
In this section, we use sequential hypothesis testing to make
decisions with minimum number of feedback from the peer
IDSs, [11], [12]. An IDS asks for feedback from its acquain-
tance list until a sufficient number of answers are collected.
Let Ωi denote all the possible collections of feedback in the
acquaintance list to an IDS i and ωi ∈ Ωi denotes a particular
collection of feedback. Let N i(ωi) be a random variable de-
noting the number of feedbacks used until a decision is made.
A sequential decision rule is formed by a pair (φ, δ), where
φi = {φin, n ∈ N} is a stopping rule and δi = {δin, n ∈ N}
is the terminal decision rule. Introduce a stopping rule with
n feedback, φin : Yin :=
∏
j∈Ni,n
Yj → {0, 1}, where Ni,n is
the set of nodes an IDS i asks up to time n. φin = 0 indicates
3that IDS i needs to take more samples after n rounds whereas
φin = 1 means to stop asking for feedback and a decision can
be made by the rule δin. The minimum number of feedbacks
is given by
N i(ωi) = min{n : φin = 1, n ∈ N}. (5)
Note that N i(ωi) is the stopping time of the decision rule.
The decision rule δi is not used until N. We assume that no
cost has incurred when a correct decision is made while the
cost of a missed intrusion is denoted by CiM and the cost of
a false alarm is denoted by CiF . In addition, we assume each
feedback incurs a cost Di. We introduce an optimal sequential
rule that minimizes Bayes risk given by
Ri(φi, δi) = R(φi, δi|H0)pi
i
0 +R(φ
i, δi|H1)pi
i
1, (6)
where R(φi, δi|Hl), l = 0, 1, are the Bayes risks under
hypotheses H0 and H1, respectively:
R
i(φi, δi|H0) = C
i
FP[δN (Yj , j ∈ Ni,N) = 1|H0] +D
i
E[N |H0],
R
i(φi, δi|H1) = C
i
MP[δN (Yj , j ∈ Ni,N) = 0|H1] +D
i
E[N |H1].
Let V i(pii0) = minφi,δi Ri(φi, δi) be the optimal value
function. It is clear that when no feedback are obtained from
the peers, the Bayes risks reduce to
Ri(φi0 = 1, δ
i
0 = 1) = C
i
Fpi
i
0, (7)
Ri(φi0 = 1, δ
i
0 = 0) = C
i
Mpi
i
1. (8)
Hence, H1 is chosen when CiFpii0 < CiMpii1 or pi0 <
CiM
Ci
F
+Ci
M
,
and H0 is chosen otherwise. The minimum Bayes risk under
no feedback is thus obtained as a function of pii0 and is denoted
by
T i(pii0) =
{
CiFpi
i
0 if pi0 <
CiM
Ci
F
+Ci
M
,
CiM (1− pi
i
0) otherwise.
(9)
The minimum cost function (9) is a piecewise linear function.
For φi such that φi0 = 0, i.e., at least one feedback is
obtained, let the minimum Bayes risk be denoted by J i(pii0) =
min{(φi,δi):φi
0
=0}R
i(φi, δi). Hence, the optimal Bayes risk
needs to satisfy
V i(pii0) = min{T
i(pii0), J
i(pii0)}. (10)
Note that J i(pii0) must be greater than the cost of one sample
Di as a sample request incurs Di and J i(pii0) is concave in pii0
as a consequence of minimizing the linear Bayes risk (6). If the
cost Di is high enough so that J i(pii0) > T i(pii0) for all pii0,
then no feedback will be requested. In this case, V i(pii0) =
T i(pii0), and the terminal rule is described in (9). For other
values of Di > 0, due to the piecewise linearity of T i(pii0) and
concavity of J i(pii0), we can see that J i(pii0) and T i(pii0) have
two intersection points piiL and piiH such that piiL ≤ piiH . It can
be shown that for some reasonably low cost Di and pii0 such
that piiL < pii0 < piiH , an IDS optimizes its risk by requesting
another feedback; otherwise, an IDS should choose to raise an
alarm when pii0 ≤ piiL and report no intrusion when pii0 ≤ piiL.
Assuming that it takes the same cost Di for IDS i to acquire
a feedback, the problem has the same form after obtaining a
feedback from a peer. IDS i can use the feedback to update
its apriori probability. After n feedback are obtained, pii0 can
be updated as follows:
pii0(n) =
pii0
pii0 + (1− pi
i
0)L
i
n
; (11)
where Lin :=
∏
j∈Ni,n
p(yj |H1)
p(yj |H0)
. We can thus obtain the
optimum Bayesian rule captured by Algorithm 1 below, known
as the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) for a reasonable
cost Di.
Algorithm 1 SPRT Rule for an IDS i
Step 1: Start with n = 0. Use (12) as a stopping rule until
φin = 1 for some n ≥ 0.
φin =
{
0 if piiL < pii0(n) < piiH ,
1 otherwise. (12)
or in terms of the likelihood ratio Lin, we can use
φin =
{
0 if Ai < Lin < Bi
1 otherwise , where A
i =
pii
0
(1−piiH)
(1−pii
0
)pii
H
and
Bi =
pii
0
(1−piiL)
(1−pii
0
)pii
L
.
Step 2: Go to Step 3 if φin = 1 or n = |Ni|; otherwise,
choose a new peer from the acquaintance list to request a
diagnosis and go to Step 2 with n = n+ 1.
Step 3: Apply the terminal decision rule as follows to
determine whether there is an intrusion.
δin =
{
1 if pii0(n) ≤ piiL
0 if pii0(n) > piiH
or δin =
{
1 if Lin ≤ Ai
0 if Lin > Bi
B. Prior Probabilities
In the above section, the conditional probabilities
pi(yi|Hl), i ∈ N , l = {0, 1} are assumed to be known. In this
section, we use the beta distribution and its Gaussian approx-
imation to find the probabilities. We let pi(yi = 0|H1) := piM
be the probability of miss of an IDS i’s diagnosis, also known
as the false negative (FN) rate; and let piF := pi(yi = 1|H0)
be the probability of false alarm or false positive (FP) rate.
The probability of detection, or true positive (TP) rate, can be
expressed as piD = 1− piM .
Based on historical data, an IDS j can assess the distribu-
tions over its peer IDS i’s probabilities of detection and false
alarm as beta functions parameterized by αFi , αDi and βFi , βFi ;
p
i
F ∼ Beta(xi|αiF , βiF ) =
Γ(αiF+β
i
F )
Γ(αi
F
)Γ(βi
F
)
x
αiF−1
i (1− xi)
βiF−1, (13)
p
i
D ∼ Beta(yi|αiD, βiD) =
Γ(αiD+β
i
D)
Γ(αi
D
)Γ(βi
D
)
y
αiD−1
i (1− yi)
βiD−1, (14)
where xi, yi ∈ [0, 1]; αFi , αDi and βFi , βFi are beta function
parameters that are updated according to historical data as
follows.
α
i
F =
∑
k∈M0
(λiF )
tikr
i
F,k, β
i
F =
∑
k∈M0
(λiF )
tik(1− riF,k); (15)
α
i
D =
∑
k∈M1
(λiD)
tikr
i
D,k, β
i
D =
∑
k∈M1
(λiD)
tik(1− riD,k). (16)
The introduction of the discount factors λiF , λiD ∈ [0, 1]
allows more weights on recent data from IDS i while less on
the old ones. The discount factors on the data can be different
4for false negative and false positive rates. The parameter tik
denotes the time when k-th diagnosis data is generated (and
sent to its peer) by IDS i. The parameter riF,k, riM,k ∈ [0, 1]
is the revealed results of the k-th diagnosis data: riF,k = 1
suggests that the k-th diagnosis data from peer i yields a un-
detected intrusion while riF,k = 0 means otherwise; similarly,
riD,k = 1 indicates the data from the peer i results in a correct
detection under intrusion and riD,k = 0 suggests otherwise.
The total reported diagnosis data is the set M and they are
classified into two groups: one is where the result is either
false positive or true negative under no intrusion, denoted by
the set M0; and the other is where the result is either false
negative or true positive under intrusion, denoted by the set
M1. Both sets are disjoint satisfying M0 ∪ M1 = M and
M0 ∩M1 = ∅.
Each peer j can assess a peer i using (13) and (15), where
we have not included index j in the expressions for simplicity.
However, it is clear that (13) and (15) are assessed from the
perspective of a certain IDS j. In addition, the discount factors
in (15) need not be the same for all j. Hence, we can implicitly
view (15) dependent on j.
When parameters of the beta functions α and β in (13)
are sufficiently large, i.e., enough data are collected, beta
distribution can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution
as
Beta(α, β) ≈ N
(
α
α+ β
,
√
αβ
(α+ β)2(α+ β + 1)
)
. (17)
Note that we have dropped the superscripts and subscripts in
(17) for generality as it can be applied to all i in (13). Hence,
using the Gaussian approximation and (15), the expected piD
and piM are given by
E[piF ] =
αiF
αiF + β
i
F
, E[piD] =
αiD
αiD + β
i
D
. (18)
The mean values in (18) under large data can be intuitively
interpreted as the proportion of results of false alarm and
detection in the set M0 and M1, respectively. They can
thus be used in (1) as the assessment of the peer probability
distribution pj .
C. Threshold Approximation
In the likelihood sequential ratio test of Algorithm 1, the
threshold values A and B need to be calculated by finding piiL
and piiH from J i(pii0) and T i(pii0) in (10). The search for these
values can be quite involved using dynamic programming.
However, in this subsection, we introduce an approximation
method to find the thresholds. The approximation is based
on theoretical studies made in [11] and [12] where a random
walk or martingale model is used to yield a relation between
thresholds and false positive and false negative rates. Let
P iD, P
i
F be the probability of detection and the probability
of false alarm of an IDS i after applying the sequential
hypothesis testing for feedback aggregation. We need to point
out that these probabilities are different from the probabilities
piD, p
i
F discussed in the previous subsection, which are the raw
detection probabilities without feedback in the collaborative
network. Let P¯ iD and P¯ iF be reasonable desired performance
bounds such that P iF ≤ P¯ iF , P iD ≥ P¯ iD. Then, the thresholds
can be chosen such that Ai = 1−P¯
i
D
1−P¯F
i
, Bi =
P¯ iD
P¯ i
F
.
The next proposition gives a result on the bound of the users
that need to be on the acquaintance list to achieve the desired
performances.
Proposition 3.1: Assume that each IDS makes independent
diagnosis on their peers’ requests and each has the same
distribution pi0 = p¯0 := p¯(·|H0), pi1 = p¯1 := p¯(·|H1),
p¯0(yi = 0) = θ0, p¯1(yi = 0) = θ1, for all i ∈ N .
Let DKL(p¯0||p¯1) be the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
defined as follows.
DKL(p¯0||p¯1) =
1∑
k=0
p¯0(k) ln
p¯0(k)
p¯1(k)
, (19)
= θ0 ln
θ0
θ1
+ (1− θ0) ln
1− θ0
1− θ1
(20)
Likewise, the K-L divergence DKL(p¯1||p¯0) can be defined.
On average, an IDS needs Ni acquaintances such that
Ni ≥ max
(
⌈−
DiM
DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
⌉, ⌈
DiF
DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
⌉
)
, (21)
where DiM = PF ln
(
P iD
P i
F
)
+ PD ln
(
1−P iD
1−P i
F
)
and DiF =
P iF ln
(
1−P iD
1−P i
F
)
+ P iD ln
(
P iD
P i
F
)
. If P iF ≪ 1 and P iM ≪ 1,
we need approximately Ni such that
Ni ≥ max
(
⌈
P iD − 1
DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
⌉, ⌈−
P iF
DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
⌉
)
. (22)

Proof: The conditional expected number of feedback
needed to reach a decision on the hypothesis in SPRT can
be expressed in terms of PF and PD , [11], [12].
E[N |H0] =
1
−DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
[
P iF ln
(
P iD
P i
F
)
+ P iD ln
(
1−P iD
1−P i
F
)]
,
E[N |H1] =
1
DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
[
P iF ln
(
1−P iD
1−P i
F
)
+ P iD ln
(
P iD
P i
F
)]
,
Hence, to reach a decision we need to have at least
max{E[N |H0],E[N |H1]} independent acquaintances. Under
the assumption that both PF and P iM are much less than 1,
we can further approximate
E[N |H0] ∼ −
1− P iD
DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
,E[N |H1] ∼ −
P iF
DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
.
These lead us to inequalities (22) and (21).
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the efficiency
of the preceding feedback aggregation scheme and compare
it with other heuristic approaches, such as the simple average
aggregation and the weighted average aggregation. We validate
and confirm our theoretical results on the number of acquain-
tances needed for consultation. The results presented in this
section are produced by averaging a large number of replica-
tions with negligible confidence intervals. The parameters we
use are shown in Table I.
A. Simulation Setup
The simulation environment uses an IDN of N nodes. Each
IDS is represented by two parameters, expertise level l and
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EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
Parameter Value meaning
τSA 0.5 decision threshold of the simple average model
τWA 0.5 decision threshold of the weighted average model
d 0.5 difficulty levels of intrusions and test messages
λF , λD 0.9 discount factors in (15)
pi0, pi1 0.5 probability of no-attack and under-attack
C00, C11 0 cost of correct decisions
decision threshold τp. At the beginning, each peer receives
an initial acquaintance list containing all the other neighbor
nodes. In the process of the collaborative intrusion detection,
a node sends out requests to its acquaintances for intrusion
assessments. The feedback collected are used to make a final
decision, i.e., whether to raise an alarm or not. We implement
three different feedback mechanisms, namely, simple average
aggregation, weighted average aggregation, and hypothesis
testing aggregation. We compare their efficiency by the av-
erage cost of false decisions.
1) Simple Average Model: If the average of all feedback
exceeds a threshold τSA, then an alarm is raised. τSA is set
to 0.5 if no cost difference is considered for making FP and
FN decisions. The simple average mechanism to aggregate
feedback is adopted in the literature such as [1].
2) Weighed Average Model: Weights are assigned to feed-
back from different IDSs to calculate weighted average.
Weighted average is widely used to aggregate feedback, such
as [2] and [3], where weights are the trust values of IDSs
and trust values are calculated based on their past history. If
the weighted average is greater than a threshold τWA, then an
alarm is raised. τWA is fixed to 0.5 in our experiments because
their models do not consider the cost difference between FP
and FN. In this simulation, we adopt trust values from [3] as
the weights of feedback.
B. Modeling of an Individual IDS
To simulate the intrusion detection capability of each node,
we use a Beta distribution for the decision model of an IDS.
A Beta density function is given by
f(p¯|α¯, β¯) =
1
B(α¯, β¯)
p¯α¯−1(1− p¯)β¯−1, (23)
α¯ = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)
r, β¯ = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)
(1− r).
where B(α¯, β¯) =
∫ 1
0
tα¯−1(1 − t)β¯−1dt, p¯ ∈ [0, 1] is the
probability of intrusion assessed by the host IDS. f(p¯|α¯, β¯)
is the probability that a peer with expertise level l ∈ [0, 1]
answers with a value of p¯ to an intrusion assessment of
difficulty level d ∈ [0, 1]. Higher values of d are associated
with attacks that are difficult to detect, i.e., many peers may fail
to identify them. Higher values of l imply a higher probability
of producing correct intrusion assessment. r ∈ {0, 1} is the
expected result of detection. r = 1 indicates that there is an
intrusion and r = 0 indicates that there is no intrusion.
Let τp be the decision threshold of p¯. If p¯ > τp, a peer sends
feedback 1 (i.e., under-attack); otherwise, feedback 0 (i.e., no-
attack) is generated.
For a fixed difficulty level, the preceding model assigns
higher probabilities of producing correct intrusion diagnosis to
peers with higher level of expertise. l = 1 or d = 0 represent
extreme cases where the peer can always accurately detect
the intrusion. This is reflected in the Beta distribution with
α¯, β¯ →∞.
Figure 2 shows that both the FP and FN decrease when
the expertise level of an IDS increases. We notice that the
curves of FP rate and FN rate overlap. This is because
the IDS detection density distributions are symmetric under
r = 0 and r = 1. Figure 3 shows that the FP rate decreases
with the decision threshold while the FN rate increases with
the decision threshold. When the decision threshold is 0,
all feedback are positive (under-attack); when the decision
threshold is 1, all feedback are negative (no-attack).
C. Detection Accuracy and Cost
One of the most important metrics to evaluate a feedback
aggregation scheme is the cost of incorrect decisions. In this
experiment, we study the costs of the three aggregation models
using a simulated network. We set N = 10 and fix the
expertise level l of all nodes to 0.5 and set C10 = C01 = 1
in (3) for the fairness of comparison, since the simple average
and the weighted average models do not account for the
cost difference between FP and FN. We fix the decision
threshold for each IDS (τp) to 0.1 for the first batch run and
then increase it by 0.1 in each subsequent batch run until it
reaches 0.9. We measure the cost of the three models. As
shown in Figure 4, the costs yielded by the aggregation using
hypothesis testing remains the lowest among the three under
all threshold settings. The costs of the weighted average and
the simple average are close to each other. This is because
in this experiment, the weights of all IDSs are the same.
Therefore, the difference between the weighted average and
the simple average is not substantial. We also observe that
changing the threshold has a big impact on the costs of the
weighted average and the simple average, while the cost of the
hypothesis testing changes only slightly with the thresholds.
All costs reach a minimum when the threshold is 0.5 and
increase when it deviates from 0.5.
In the next experiment, the expertise levels of all nodes
remain 0.5 and their decision thresholds vary from 0.1 to 0.9.
We set C10 = C01 = 1 in the first batch run and increase
C01 by 1 in every subsequent batch run. We observe the costs
under three different models. Figure 5 shows that the costs
of the simple average model and the weighted average model
increase linearly with C01 while cost of hypothesis testing
model grows the slowest among the three. This is because the
hypothesis testing model has a flexible threshold to optimize
its cost. The hypothesis testing model has superiority when
the cost difference between FP and FN is large.
D. Sequential Consultation
In this experiment, we study the number of acquaintances
needed for consultation to reach a predefined goal. Suppose the
TP lower-bound P¯D = 0.95 and FP upper-bound P¯F = 0.1.
We observe the change of FP rate and TP rate with the number
of acquaintances consulted (n). Figure 6 shows that FP rate
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decreases and TP rate increases with n. Consulting higher ex-
pertise nodes leads to a higher TP rate and a lower FP rate. In
the next experiment we implement Algorithm 1 on each node
and measure the average number of acquaintances needed to
reach the predefined TP lower-bound and the FP upper-bound.
Figure 7 compares the simulation results with the theoretical
results (see (22)), where the former confirms the latter. In
both cases, the number of consultations decreases quickly with
the expertise levels of acquaintances. For example, the IDS
needs to consult around 50 acquaintances of expertise 0.2,
while only 3 acquaintances of expertise 0.7 are needed for the
same purpose. This is partly because low expertise nodes are
more likely to make conflicting feedbacks and consequently
increase the number of consultations. The analytical results
can be useful for IDSs to design the size of their acquaintance
lists.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a sequential hypothesis
testing approach to feedback aggregation in a collaborative in-
trusion detection network. In this mechanism, an IDS consults
sequentially for peer diagnoses until it is capable of making an
aggregated decision that satisfies Bayes optimal cost criterion.
The decision is made based on a threshold rule leveraging
the likelihood ratio approximated by beta distribution and
thresholds by target rates. Our experimental results show that
our proposed feedback aggregation model is superior to other
proposed models in the literature in terms of cost efficiency.
Our simulation results have also corroborated our theoreti-
cal results on the average number of acquaintances needed
to reach the predefined false positive upper-bound and true
positive lower-bound. As future work, we intend to investigate
the robustness of the collaboration system against malicious
insiders, especially under collusion attacks. Furthermore, we
aim to extend our results to deal with the case of correlated
feedbacks.
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